When a group key exchange protocol is executed, the session key is typically extracted from two types of secrets; long-term keys (for authentication) and freshly generated (often random) values. The leakage of this latter so-called ephemeral keys has been extensively analyzed in the 2-party case, yet very few works are concerned with it in the group setting. We provide a generic group key exchange construction that is strongly secure, meaning that the attacker is allowed to learn both long-term and ephemeral keys (but not both from the same participant, as this would trivially disclose the session key). Our design can be seen as a compiler, in the sense that it builds on a 2-party key exchange protocol which is strongly secure and transforms it into a strongly secure group key exchange protocol by adding only one extra round of communication. When applied to an existing 2-party protocol from Bergsma et al., the result is a 2-round group key exchange protocol which is strongly secure in the standard model, thus yielding the first construction with this property.
Introduction
Group key establishment (GKE) protocols are a fundamental cryptographic building block allowing n ≥ 2 participants to agree upon a common secret key. It is usually assumed that these participants hold both long-term secrets, which are typically used for authentication and ephemeral secrets, which are session-specific randomly generated values that provide enough entropy for the key to be indistinguishable from random in some sense.
The way to define and handle key privacy in GKE is highly dependent on the amount of information the adversary is supposed to obtain from the two types of secrets described above. In the literature, leakage of ephemeral secrets is often modeled through a RevealState oracle, which when invoked by the adversary outputs either ephemeral keys as described above or a larger set containing them, typically referred to as the full state of the attacked user. Unfortunately, as first pointed out by Cremers in [16] , the meaning of full state is scarcely defined within the security model and often the output of the corresponding oracle calls is only made explicit when proving particular protocols secure. Generally speaking, ephemeral key leakage refers to the exposure of user-generated fresh randomness, while full state compromise involves in addition other values computed/stored by the user -yet never any long-term keys.
Previous work. Strong security for GKE protocols was first considered in [9] . As it is also the case with subsequent proposals dealing with this type of leakage [8, 24, 26] , in this paper it is assumed that the adversary can not access any ephemeral secret of the attacked session.
In order to subsume a wider class of attacks, other works have removed this restriction excluding only reveals of both the ephemeral and long-term secrets of the same user (as, in this case, the session key would be trivially disclosed). Some examples of secure proposals along these lines are the NAXOS protocol [35] in the 2-party setting and [36, 20] for the case of 3 users. In the general multi-user group setting Zhao et al. [42] modified a protocol by Bohli et al. [6] to obtain strong security. This proposal was however found flawed in [14] where an improvement was proposed, which is proven secure in the random oracle model.
Many of these previous works have in common that the access to the ephemeral secrets is modelled granting the adversary a RevealState oracle, which, when queried, outputs the contents of a variable state linked to the execution. As pointed out by Cremers [16] , the security in these models is highly dependent on how the state variable is defined for each concrete protocol. In addition Cremers shows that the NAXOS protocol, proven secure in the model with a different formalism (namely, defining a so-called RevealEphemeralKey oracle), is insecure when more powerful state reveals are allowed. Also in this spirit, in a recent work from PKC2015, Bergsma et al. [5] present a generic 1-round 2-party key exchange construction in the standard model. The authors also propose a strong security model which builds on previous ones and captures both perfect forward secrecy and ephemeral secrets leakage. The latter is modeled by a RevealRand oracle which outputs the local randomness selected by the user in a protocol execution.
Our contributions. We propose a security model for GKE capturing the leakage of ephemeral secrets even within the attacked session. To avoid any ambiguity we define, in the line of [5] in the 2-party setting, a variable rand that stores, for each instance of a participant, all the session values that cannot be computed from long-term secret keys or other values received/computed previously in the session. Typically these values are chosen uniformly at random from a prescribed set, therefore the name of the variable. The adversary is given access to an oracle RevealRand which outputs the values stored in rand when queried. The strength of our security model is comparable to that of [42] , yet in their treatment ephemeral values involved in the authentication procedure are not included in rand as they are in our case. 1 In addition, the main contribution of this work is a generic protocol or compiler that, building on any strongly secure 2-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol, produces a group AKE which is strongly secure in our model, by adding only one round of communication. 2 Further, we highlight that:
• Our construction is the first to expressly take into account the randomness used for authentication. We do so by expliciting that the nonces involved in any signature produced are part of the rand variable linked to the signing instance, and therefore allowing the adversary to obtain these values. This improves previous works, such us [14, 42] where the random values for the signature are supposed to be protected or absent (by using a deterministic signature).
• When instantiated with a 1-round 2-party protocol strongly secure in the standard model, for instance [5] , our compiler produces a 2-round GKE which is strongly secure in the standard mode. This scheme is the first construction achieving such strong security guarantees in only two communication rounds.
2 Security Model
Description and strong security
Our security model is a modification of that of Bohli et al [6] , which in turn builds in [4, 3, 33] . Furthemore, we treat 1 Actually, as evidenced in [41] , the scheme proposed in [42] cannot be proven secure otherwise. We remark here however that in [41] no augmented security notion for group key agreement is put forward along this line. In particular, the scheme of Zhao et al. [42] attacked in this paper is not proven to be secure if (as suggested by the authors) the underlying signature scheme resists randomness leakage. 2 A preliminary version of this generic protocol can be found in the short abstract [23] , where no security proof is provided and mutual authentication is not considered. ephemeral reveals in a similar way as [42, 14] . 3 Protocol instances. Users are modeled as probabilistic polynomial time (ppt) Turing machines. Each user from a set U of possible participants may execute a polynomial number of protocol instances in parallel. To refer to instance s i of a user U i ∈ U we use the notation Π si i (i, s i ∈ N). To each instance we assign seven variables, informally described next:
• used si i indicates whether this instance is or has been used for a protocol run;
• state si i keeps the internal state of the Turing machine that executes the protocol;
• rand si i keeps the session-specific atomic secret values -typically values generated uniformly at randomwhich will be referred to as ephemeral keys. More precisely, these are any values that cannot be computed from long-term secret keys or other values received/computed previously in the session;
• term si i shows if the execution has terminated;
• sid si i denotes a session identifier;
• pid si i stores the set of identities of those users that Π si i aims at establishing a key with -including U i himself;
• acc Communication network. Arbitrary point-to-point connections among the users are assumed to be available. The network is non-private, however, and fully asynchronous. More specifically, it is controlled by the adversary, who may delay, insert and delete messages at will.
Adversarial capabilities. We restrict to ppt adversaries. The capabilities of an adversary A are made explicit through a number of oracles allowing A to communicate with protocol instances run by the users:
• Send(U i , s i , M ) This sends message M to the instance Π • Execute({Π su 1 u1 , . . . , Π su µ uµ }) This executes a complete protocol run among the specified unused instances of the respective users. The adversary obtains a transcript of all messages sent over the network. A query to the Execute oracle is supposed to reflect a passive eavesdropping.
• Reveal(U i , s i ) Yields the session key sk • Test(U i , s i ) Provided that the session key is defined (i. e. acc si i = true and sk si i =⊥) and instance Π si i is fresh (we define freshness later on), A can execute this oracle query at any time when being activated. Then, the session key sk si i is returned if b = 0 and a uniformly chosen random session key is returned if b = 1, where b is a hidden bit chosen at random prior to the first call. Namely, an arbitrary number of Test queries is allowed for the adversary A, but once the Test oracle returned a value for an instance Π si i , it will return the same value for all instances partnered (see the definition of partnering bellow) with Π si i . 4 • RevealRand(U i , s i ) This oracle returns the value stored in rand si i .
• Corrupt(U i ) This oracle returns the long term key hold by U i . 3 Interpreting their RevealEphemeralSecret oracle as equivalent to our RevealRand, which is not the only possible interpretation. We aim at two basic goals for our protocol: correctness and strong security. A protocol is correct if all users involved in an execution in the presence of a passive adversary compute the same session key. Our notion of strong security ensures key privacy in the presence of an active adversary which is given access to all the oracles we have described. Before formally defining correctness and strong security, we introduce partnering and freshness, to express which instances are associated in a common protocol session and limit when the adversary is allowed to call the Test oracle.
Partnering. We refer to instances Π Freshness. A Test-query should only be allowed to those instances holding a key that is not for trivial reasons known to the adversary. To this aim, an instance Π Definition 2.4 (Strong security) Let A be an adversary making at most q s and q e queries to the Send and Execute oracles respectively. Let k ∈ N be the security parameter and denote by Succ A (k, q s , q e ) the probability that A queries Test only on fresh instances and guesses correctly the bit b used by the Test oracle in a moment when all these instances are still fresh. We say a group key establishment protocol is (q s , q e )-strongly secure if the advantage Adv A−SGAKE (k, q s , q e ) of any ppt adversary A in attacking the protocol is bounded by another function Adv SGAKE (k, q s , q e ) which is negligible in k, where the aforementioned advantage is defined as
Note that our definition provides a strong notion of key privacy, including perfect forward secrecy [27, 18] and resistance to key compromise impersonation (KCI) attacks against key privacy [25] :
Perfect forward secrecy. An adversary getting the long-term key of a user should not gain any information on the session keys previously established by that user. Our definition captures perfect forward secrecy, since an adversary A is allowed to obtain the long-term keys of all users without violating freshness, provided he does not send any "relevant" messages after having received these long-term keys.
Key compromise impersonation resilience (against key privacy). An adversary is said to impersonate a user B to another user A if B is honest and the protocol instance at A accepts the session with B as one of his session peers, but there is no such partnered instance at B. An adversary A is considered successful in mounting a key compromise impersonation (KCI) attack knowing a user A's long-term private key if he manages to impersonate an honest party B to A. As pointed out in [25] , when the goal of the adversary is to break the confidentiality of the session key, it only makes sense to consider an outsider adversary (see also [25] for precise definitions of outsider and insider adversaries). Our security definition takes this kind of attacks into account, since if Π si i is the Test session then U i may be corrupted (although the adversary cannot be active with respect to a partner Π sj j of Π si i without violating freshness).
Further security properties
In addition to key privacy, several other security requirements such as unknown key-share resilience, key confirmation, explicit key authentication and mutual authentication are desirable for a group key exchange protocol. All of them are covered by the notion of MA-security [10] , which was enhanced in [25] to deal with outsider and insider KCI attacks. Here we adopt the stronger one, MA-security with insider KCIR (key compromise impersonation resilience), yet slightly modifying the definition given in [25] as we consider RevealRand instead of RevealState queries. 3 Proposal of a secure protocol
Signatures withstanding randomness reveals
Our proposal of a secure protocol will make use of a signature scheme for authentication. As our security model allows the adversary to access the random coins involved in a protocol execution by means of the oracle RevealRand, we assume that this oracle also outputs the randomness used for signing (if any). Note that this issue was mentioned in [14] but not considered in the proposed construction, as the authors suggest using a trusted device to protect this value or a deterministic signature scheme. As evidenced in [41] , the security of this scheme is jeopardized if such precautions are not taken.
We are thus in need of stronger security guarantees, and therefore introduce a security notion for signature schemes, which we call existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message and randomness reveal attacks (EUF-CMRA), capturing the property of remaining secure even if the randomness used when signing is leaked. This notion is identical to unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attacks and ephemeral secret leakage attacks security defined independently by Tseng et al in [41] 5 . Before providing the definition, let us recap some terminology. A public key signature scheme S is explicited by three algorithms (KeyGen, Sign, Verify), where KeyGen, on input the security parameter, outputs a pair (vk, sigk), 5 At the writting of this paper we were not aware of this work, and have further decided to keep the name we had initially chosen for this notion. the public verification key and the secret signing key respectively; Sign outputs a signature σ = Sign(sigk, m, sigr) where m is the signed message and sigr is a random value chosen from an appropriate set every time Sign is invoked. Further, Verify is the (publicly available) verification algorithm. Note that we are considering that Sign takes the random coins sigr as explicit input: this covers probabilistic and deterministic signature schemes; for the later we allow sigr to be the empty string. Now the standard security definition for signature schemes, i.e. existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA), is strengthened by giving the adversary access to a more powerful oracle, that also provides the randomness used when generating the signature. More formally, the adversary A will play the following game (EUF-CMRA, from existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message and randomness reveal attacks):
1. (vk, sigk) is generated with KeyGen and vk is provided to A; 2. the adversary is given access to a signing oracle O sigk (.) such that, every time a message m j is queried, a random value sigr j is chosen as specified in the signing algorithm, a signature σ j = Sign(sigk, m j , sigr j ) is generated and (σ j , sigr j ) = O sigk (m j ) is returned to A;
3. after adaptively querying the oracle, A outputs a pair (m, σ).
We say that A wins the EUF-CMRA game if m has not been queried to O sigk (.) and σ is a valid signature for m. Let Adv A−EUF-CMRA (k, q) denote the probability that an adversary A, making at most q calls to the signing oracle O sigk (.), wins the EUF-CMRA game when the security parameter is k.
Definition 3.1 (EUF-CMRA security) The signature scheme S is q-existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message and randomness reveal attacks (q − EUF-CMRA) if for every probabilistic polynomial time adversary A making at most q calls to the signing oracle, the function Adv A−EUF-CMRA (k, q) is bounded by another function Adv EUF-CMRA (k, q) which is negligible in the security parameter k.
Remark 3.2
This security notion is trivially achieved if S is a EUF-CMA signature scheme which is either deterministic or such that the randomness is part of the signature.
As pointed out in [40] , in many existing signature schemes, the randomness is generated in the signing phase and provided to the verifier as part of the signature. For instance, signature schemes in [7, 12, 13, 15, 19, 22, 28, 29, 30, 37, 39, 43] fulfill this property and, therefore satisfy our EUF-CMRA security notion.
Collision resistant pseudorandom function families
In our construction we use a pseudorandom function (PRF) family F = {F } ∈N , F = {F α } α∈{0,1} , which has the additional property of being collision resistant (see, for example, [32] ). Next we recall the definition. Consider the game where an element v in the domain of all functions in F , is chosen according to a randomized sampling algorithm and given to an adversary A. 6 The adversary is also given access to an oracle F (.) (v ) and is said to win the game if it outputs a pair of indexes α = α ∈ {0, 1} such that F α (v ) = F α (v ), without having queried both indexes to the oracle. We denote by Adv A-COLL-PRF ( , q) the probability that an adversary A, making at mostueries to the oracle, wins the game.
Definition 3.3
The PRF family F = {F } ∈N is q-collision resistant if for every probabilistic polynomial time adversary A making at most q calls to the evaluation oracle, the function Adv A-COLL-PRF ( , q) is bounded by another function Adv COLL-PRF ( , q) which is negligible in .
In addition and for subsequent use in our security statements, we will denote by Adv PRF ( , q) the function which upper bounds the advantage of any adversary trying to distinguish a function in F from a random one (making at mostueries to the function oracle). Note that, due to the PRF property of the family F, Adv PRF ( , q) is negligible in the security parameter .
In our design, we will use a family of universal hash functions UH = {UH } ∈N , such that, for a given ∈ N every function in UH maps bitstrings of a fixed size t onto {0, 1} . The family UH will be used to select an index within a collision-resistant pseudorandom function family F = {F } ∈N . In the sequel, both parameters and t are assumed to be sufficiently large and polynomial in the security parameter k. Due to the universal property of the family UH, the probability of any function UH ∈ UH producing the same output with two different inputs is at most 1/2 t (see, for instance, [38] ).
From 2-Party to group keeping strong security
In this section we present a one-round compiler, which applied to a strongly secure 2-party key exchange 2-SAKE yields a strongly secure group key exchange, adding only one communication round. Our construction does not involve any idealized assumption, thus if the 2-SAKE is in the standard model, so will the resulting n-party protocol be. Our design is detailed in Figure 1 , where the Set up phase can be realized by means of a public key infraestructure (PKI) -and should thus be assumed to involve a trusted entity. At this, users are supposed to be somewhat organized in a cycle (a la Burmester-Desmedt, see [11] ); thus, user indices i are to be taken modulo n. Note that we further assume that there might be independent authentication keys used for the 2-party and group setting, namely, the compiler will call for (freshly generated) signing keys for a dedicated signature scheme (which we will denote by (vk i , sigk i )) while we also explicit each user may have generated a pair of long-term keys (2pk i , 2sk i ) for 2-SAKE. 7 Before moving on to the security statements let us specify how the RevealRand and Corrupt oracles work for the compiled scheme. A query Corrupt(U j ) is answered with the long-term secret key
where − → r i , ← − r i are the random coins used in the two executions of the 2-SAKE, r i is the random nonce used in Round 1 of the compiler, and sigr j i , for j = 0, 1 are the nonces involved in the two signatures enforced by the compiler. Now it is easy to argue that RevealRand is not useful for the adversary, and thus the strong security of our scheme follows. Indeed, RevealRand(U i ) returns: a) the randomness used by U i in the 2-SAKE protocol, which is of no use for the adversary due to the strong security of 2-SAKE; b) the signing nonces sigr 0 i , sigr 1 i , which will also be useless if the signature scheme is secure in the sense of EUF-CMRA; c) the nonce r i , which is anyway public, as it is broadcast in Round 1.
Theorem 3.4
Assuming S is an EUF-CMRA signature scheme, 2-SAKE is strongly secure, F is a collision-resistant PRF and UH is a universal hash function family, the protocol from Figure 1 is correct and strongly secure. More precisely, let k and be as in the protocol specification from Figure 1 . Then, for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary A making at most q s calls to the Send oracle and q e calls to the Execute oracle, where Adv 2-SAKE (·, ·, ·) is the advantage in regard to 2-SAKE, specified as in Definition 2.4 and t is polynomial in k.
Set up:
Fix ∈ N polynomial in the security parameter k. Let UH be a family of universal hash functions ranging in {0, 1} and F be a collision-resistant pseudorandom function family. A function UH : {0, 1} t → {0, 1} from UH and a description of F are made public together with a value v in the domain of all functions from F .
a
We assume all users to know a priori their partners and have set the variable pid accordingly.
Furthermore, a pair of keys (vk i , sigk i ) for the signature scheme S is generated for each U i , which gets the secret key sigk i while vk i is publicized.
Round 0:
Usage of 2-SAKE.
• For i = 1, . . . , n execute 2-SAKE(U i , U i+1 ); after that each user U i holds two keys − → K i and ← − K i shared with U i+1 and U i−1 respectively. • Additionally, in the last round of the 2-SAKE, each U i -chooses a random nonce r i ∈ R {0, 1} ; -computes a signature σ
Round 1:
Computation. Each U i :
• Checks the signatures σ 0 j ; if something fails, aborts; • Sets sid i := pid i |r 1 | . . . |r n ;
• Computes a signature σ
Check. Each U i checks all the signatures, equality of pid's, sid's, consistency of ← − ρ i and − → ρ i ; if something fails, aborts. Computation. Each U i
• for j = 1, . . . , n, computes ← − K j and sets
a We assume t to be sufficiently large, and the input values to UH to be padded consistently. PROOF. Checking the correctness of the protocol is straightforward: if all the participants follow the protocol description and there is no active adversarial intervention, then all checks will succeed and every participant will set the same pid and sid, obtain the same {K j } n j=1 from the broadcast {X j } n j=1 and consequently compute the same session key.
The proof for the strong security is conducted through a sequence of games. Following standard notation, we denote by Adv(A, G i ) the advantage of the adversary when confronted with Game i. The security parameter is denoted by k. Further, in the sequel we let q e and q s denote the maximum number of calls made by the adversary to the Execute and Send oracles (resp.).
Game 0. All the oracles are simulated as in the real protocol; thus, Adv(A, G 0 ) is exactly Adv A−SGAKE (k, q s , q e ) as in the definition of strong security from Section 2. Game 1. This game is identical to Game 0, except that the execution is aborted if the event Repeat occurs. This is defined to happen if an uncorrupted participant chooses in Round 0 a nonce r i that was previously used by an oracle of some principal.
As q e and q s denote the maximum number of calls to the Execute and Send oracles respectively, the number of nonces generated by honest users during the game is at most nq e + q s . Therefore the probability of Repeat is upper bounded by the probability of collision when choosing nq e + q s values among 2 possible ones, which is in turn upper bounded by (nq e + q s ) 2 /(2 · 2 ) (see, for example, appendix A.4 in [31] ). As a result,
Game 2. This is identical to Game 1, except that now the execution is aborted if the adversary succeeds in forging an authenticated message M σ for participant U i without having queried Corrupt(U i ) and where M was not output by any of U i 's instances. Let us call this event Forge.
Indeed, an adversary A that can reach Forge can be used for forging a signature in a EUF-CMRA game: the given public key is assigned randomly to one of the n users in the group and all other parties are initialized following the protocol specification; then all the queries in the strong security game are answered faithfully and whenever a signature for a message of the selected user is needed, the signing oracle of the EUF-CMRA game is queried to produce the signature. Note that the number of such queries is upper bounded by 2q e + q s . The probability of the adversary choosing the "right" user U i when assigning the public key for the signature equals 1/n, therefore we have Adv EUF-CMRA (k, 2q e + q s ) ≥ 1 n P (Forge) which yields αµ+1 have jointly executed 2-SAKE, hold two nonces r αµ and r αµ+1 linked to this execution 8 and, furthermore, they all hold the same pid (namely, pid α0 = · · · = pid αr ). The adversary A can detect the difference to Game 2 if A replayed or fabricated a message that should have led to acceptance in Round 1 in that game. Since all messages broadcasted in Round 1 must contain the signed nonce r i (as part of the signed sid i ) and we excluded already the events Forge and Repeat, games 2 and 3 are identical for A. As a result
Game 4. In this game, we impose that a fresh instance Π ti i does not accept the session key in Round 1 whenever two instances Π tj j and Π tj+1 j+1 in the same session (as above) which have jointly executed 2-SAKE and hold matching nonces r j and r j+1 linked to this execution hold however non-matching two party keys 9 . Let us denote this event by Coll. Due to the modifications made in Game 3, in a fresh session every message must have been generated according to the specification of the protocol. Therefore the event Coll happens only if there are two instances Π tj j and Π tj+1 j+1 such that
(as otherwise the involved instances would not accept).
Let UH be the function chosen at the beginning of the protocol and denote by
it is clear that the event Coll happens only if one of the two following events happen:
• Coll1, which is the event that during the security game there exist instances Π tj j and Π tj+1 j+1 such that
• Coll2, which is the event that during the security game there exists instances Π tj j and Π tj+1 j+1 such that
Because of the universal property of the family UH, the probability of UH producing the same output with two different inputs is at most 1/2 t . In addition the number of possible pairs of nonces generated during the security game is upper bounded by nq e + qs 2 . As a result,
On the other hand, an adversary A which produces the event Coll2 can be used to construct an adversary against the collision resistance of the pseudo-random family F. The reason is that, in case Coll2 happens, then two different indexes − → α j = ← − α j+1 have been found such that F− → α j (v) = F← − α j+1 (v). As the function F (.) (v) is invoked at most 3nq e + q s times during the game, it holds that
Putting everything together we have |Adv(A,
and thus by 1 2 t (nq e + q s 2 ) + Adv COLL-PRF ( , 3nq e + q s ). In order to bound the distance between G 3 and G 4 we will build, from an adversary A which is able to distinguish between these two games, another adversary B attacking the underlying 2-SAKE protocol such that
where Adv B−2-SAKE (k, q To prove this bound, assume that B, which runs A as an auxiliary algorithm, is given access to a simulation of 2-SAKE. Further, B executes the key generation algorithm of S for each user U i , thus retrieving a pair of corresponding signing keys (vk i , sigk i ).
Now, whenever an instance Π of the same user in the 2-SAKE protocol. Also a list L, storing the returned random nonces r i , is needed to answer the queries of A. More precisely, the first time a random nonce r i is required to answer a RevealRand A , Execute A or Send A query involving instance Π s i , a random value r i is chosen u.a.r. from the appropriate set and (U i , s, r i ) is stored in L. Whenever this value is needed again to answer a query, it is extracted from L. Similarly, B maintains a list for the signing nonces SigL, where he stores appropiately generated randomness involved in any of the signatures that might be involved in the simulation. Now let us describe how the answers to the queries of A are constructed:
• Whenever a query Corrupt A (U i ) is made, B queries Corrupt B (U i ) to retrieve 2sk i and provides (2sk i , sigk i ) as answer to A.
• To answer a query RevealRand A (U i , s i ), B executes RevealRand B with the two associated instances Π • To answer an Execute A query, B queries Execute B with the corresponding pairs of instances to construct a transcript for Round 0. Then makes Test B queries to obtain the keys − → K i and ← − K i for every user and constructs the rest of the transcript for Round 1 and 2 as it would be done in a real execution of the protocol, taking random values from L and SigL as needed.
• To answer a Send A query for Round 0, a query Send B is executed by B with the associated instances and the same responses are returned. If the Send A query is for Round 1, first B sets the values of − → K i and ← − K i by querying one of the oracles Test B or Reveal B (depending on whether the involved instance is fresh according to our definition, and thus allows to query Test B , or not). The rest of the answer is generated as in the description of the Execute A answer.
• A Reveal A query is answered in a similar way as a Send A or Execute A query.
• Finally, to answer allowed Test A queries, a bit b ∈ {0, 1} is chosen by B at the beginning of the simulation. If b = 1 a random group key is returned while if b = 0 an actual key, constructed consistently with the rest of the simulation, is returned.
At some point A will output a bit b as a guess for b which will determine the output b of B for the 2-SAKE challenge. Namely, B outputs b = 0 if and only if b = b . Taking into account that the view of A is identical to G 4 if the answers of Test B are real keys and to G 5 if the answers of Test B are random ones, and counting q B s ≤ q s and q B e ≤ nq e , we have that
Game 6. In this game, for every i = 1, . . . , n, the value sk i := F UH(K) (v) is replaced with a random value chosen from {0, 1} κ . As by now K := (K 1 , . . . , K n , sid i ), and all the K i have been chosen u.a.r. in this game, the output of F UH(K) is, due to the pseudorandomness property of F, distinguishable from a random value only with negligible probability in (which is polynomial in k). More precisely we have,
In addition, the advantage of the adversary in G 6 equals 0, as the secret keys are chosen u.a.r. in {0, 1}
κ . This concludes the proof. 
MA-security
In this section we show our protocol satisfies MA-security with insider KCIR. For the shake of simplicity, we have chosen to formulate the security statement only in terms of the security parameter and not use the number of oracle calls. Further, we provide only a proof sketch, as a detailed one would repeat many of the arguments already specified above in the proof of Theorem 3.4. Theorem 3.5 Assuming S is an EUF-CMRA signature scheme, the protocol from Figure 1 satisfies MA-security with insider KCIR.
PROOF'S SKETCH. This result may be obtained by "game hopping", letting the adversary A ma interact with a simulator:
Game 0. In this game, the simulator faithfully simulates all protocol participants' instances for the adversary A ma , i. e., the adversary's situation is the same as in the real model:
Game 1. This game is aborted if the events Forge or Repeat, as described in the previous proof, occur. Otherwise, the game is identical to Game 0 and the adversary cannot detect the difference. The distance between the success probabilities of G 0 and G 1 is bounded by P (Forge) + P (Repeat), which is negligible in the security parameter k.
Let Π si i be an uncorrupted instance that has accepted. Notice that once these events have been eliminated, all the honest parties in pid . Therefore, for the adversary to win the MA game, the session keys accepted should be different. However, if the instance accepted, in particular U j successfully checked the confirmation strings ← − ρ j+1 and − → ρ j−1 for his left and right two-party keys respectively. This means K j and K j+1 have been computed correctly, except with negligible probability, since F is chosen from F, a collision-resistant pseudorandom function family. Then, from the values X l sent by the other users in pid si i , and the rest of the confirmation strings, one can be sure, with overwhelming probability, that all K l computed by U i and U j are equal. Therefore, both users compute the same session key.
Putting the probabilities together we recognize the adversary's advantage in the real model as negligible. 
Concrete Implementations
In this section we propose several options to instantiate our compiler. Some possible choices for the two-party 2-SAKE scheme and the EUF-CMRA signature scheme are enumerated in Tables 1 and 2 . It is worth pointing out that every signature scheme in Table 2 is secure in the standard model. In addition, [7, 12, 19] provide strong EUF-CMA; however this property is not needed for the security of our proposal, thus [28, 30] are also suitable choices.
When a one-round 2-SAKE secure in the standard model, such as [5] , is combined with any signature scheme in Table 2 , the result of applying our compiler is a two-round group key exchange protocol which is strongly secure and MA-secure in our model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first two-round group key establishment protocol with security proofs in a model considering randomness leakage in the attacked session, which does not make use of random oracles. In addition, if the choice for the signature scheme is [30] , the security of the compiled two-round protocol depends only on the well-known RSA assumption.
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